Negation as falsity: A reply to Tennant (Q2715525)

The author develops the notion of `negation as falsity', essentially based on the concept of disproof, against the background of N. Tennant's argument in favour of negation in intuitionistic relevant logic [see \textit{N. Tennant}, ``Negation, absurdity and contrariety'', in: D. M. Gabbay (ed.) et al., What is negation? Kluwer Acad. Publ., Dordrecht, Appl. Log. Ser. 13, 199-222 (1999; Zbl 0981.03007), reviewed above, ``Natural deduction and sequent calculus for intuitionistic relevant logic'', J. Symb. Logic 52, 665-680 (1987; Zbl 0652.03010)]. It is shown that negation in intuitionistic relevant logic is a negation as syntactical inconsistency and that every such negation as inconsistency is a negation as falsity, while the converse is not true.NEWLINENEWLINEFor the entire collection see [Zbl 0957.00012].