History of 19th century logic. A critical introduction to the beginnings of epistemology and philosophy of science (Q2735589)

This book claims to be a history of 19th century logic, and at the same time a critical introduction to epistemology and the philosophy of science, obviously identifying logic with these two branches of philosophy.NEWLINENEWLINENEWLINEIn 16 sections, largely unrelated to each other, and with a rather sloppy conception of what counts as 19th century, the author deals with \textit{Kant}'s formal and transcendental logic (on two pages), \textit{Hegel}'s ``Wissenschaft der Logik'', several idealistic, epistemological, empiristical, normative directions, with \textit{R. H. Lotze}'s formalism, Vienna Circle logic (paradigmatically represented by \textit{F. Waismann}, the interpreter of \textit{L. Wittgenstein}), the logics of the Neokantian schools, \textit{G. Frege}'s mathematical logic and phenomenology (\textit{G. Husserl}). No word, however, on the \textit{Herbart}ian school which gave rise to most influential formal logicians like \textit{M. W. Drobisch}. NEWLINENEWLINENEWLINETo sum up the results: Almost everything written after Hegel's conception of logic as the system of form determinants of objective knowledge represents decline. Most post-Hegelian logic systems are circular in their normative variations, fruitless and philosophically uninteresting in their formal, i.e., ``tauto-logical'' directions.NEWLINENEWLINENEWLINEReviewer's comment: The author has missed the chance to convince the reader of the fruitfulness of regarding the history of modern logic as a complex and interrelated process in which philosophical and mathematical conceptions were involved. The book is a dreadful document of one-sidedness. The author refuses any discourse with directions and research programmes not completely on his (i.e., Hegel's) line. In its polemical parts full of malice against, e.g., Lotze, Husserl, and especially against Frege, it is not critical as announced in the subtitle, but simply a cheek, discrediting the whole genre of philosophical historiography of logic.