A refinement of the concept of equilibrium in multiple objective games (Q2753331)

The authors study general \(n\)-person non-cooperative multiple objective games MOG. In particular, they propose refinements for the concept of equilibrium for nonzero-sum MOG. These refinements-type are based on the seminal papers proposed by \textit{R. Selten} [Int. J. Game Theory 4, 25-55 (1975; Zbl 0312.90072)], \textit{R. B. Myerson} [Int. J. Game Theory 7, 73-80 (1978; Zbl 0392.90093)] and \textit{J. F. Nash} [Ann. Math. (2) 54, 286-295 (1951; Zbl 0045.08202)]. However, the most remarkable result of the paper is obtained in the frame of perturbed games by which the concept of perfect equilibrium is extended to games with multiple objectives. In this direction the ideas introduced by \textit{E. Van Damme} [Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria, Springer Verlag, Berlin (1991; Zbl 0899.90167)] were fundamental.NEWLINENEWLINEFor the entire collection see [Zbl 0969.00060].