The structure of values and norms (Q2753388)

This is a valuable book. It presents a unified formal representation of values and norms based on an underlying concept of preference state. After a preliminary Chapter 1 that discusses the task of formalization itself, Chapter 2 presents the fundamental notion of preference that provides the basis for all the rest, and describes minimal conditions on such relations. Preferences can be distinguished in two kinds, `exclusionary preferences' that select from mutually exclusive alternatives, and `combinative preferences' where the alternatives are not necessarily exclusive. Both sorts may then be divided as those based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives and those that are decision-guiding, which requires selection from among all alternatives. All of these are examined in subsequent chapters. Chapters 3-4 address primarily exclusionary preferences. Chapter 3 extends the formalization begun in Chapter 2 to introduce two ways of representing a more general notion of preference states, as sets of sentences and as models. The two approaches coincide. Chapter 4 examines various operations of change of preferences. This draws on analogous work in the theory of belief revision. Chapters 5-7 take up combinative preferences, which are derived from exclusionary preferences. This includes an important investigation of how the values of wholes are related to the values of their parts. Here too pairwise and decision-guiding preferences are distinguished. Chapter 8 discusses monadic value predicates, such as `good' and `bad' in light of the preceding. Chapters 9-13 present the theory of norms, based on the underlying theory of preference developed earlier. Chapter 9 introduces the basic language of normative discourse, familiar from deontic logic. Chapter 10 examines that part of the language where there is no change in situation or normative perspective, so that only a fixed set of alternatives need be considered. In effect, this corresponds to monadic deontic logic, and we see how various relations of preference underwrite various deontic principles. Chapter 11 extends this treatment to consider a more dynamic condition where there are changing sets of alternatives, e. g., normative counterfactuals and the resolution of normative conflicts. A formal representation of rules is given in Chapter 12; this includes two sorts of dynamic processes, changes to the system of rules and its application to factual situations. Chapter 13 presents a special sort of rule that can be used to classify legal relations. The book ends with a brief Chapter 14 reflecting on how the results developed can be applied in philosophy and the social sciences. Throughout the work there is very careful attention to precise formal detail (with formal proofs of results being given in an Appendix), and yet also a sensitivity to, and respect for, issues of the relation between formalization and the informal concepts being represented. The author emphasizes how formalization has its advantages, but also its limitations. The present volume draws together much of the author's work in this area from the last 15 years, but it is updated and unified. All in all, this book is likely the most comprehensive treatment of the structure of preference relations, values, norms and rules to be found.