On two-player repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling (Q2757652)

The author studies existence of uniform equilibrium in general (non-zero sum) two-person repeated games with both (a) Lack of information on one side and (b) Imperfect observation of moves. For games with (a) but not (b), existence was proved by \textit{S. Sorin} in [Int. J. Game Theory 12, 193-205 (1983; Zbl 0526.90106)] for the case of two states of the world and by \textit{R. S. Simon, S. Spicz} and \textit{H. Torunezyk} [Isr. J. Math. 92, 1-21 (1995; Zbl 0843.90143)] for any finite number of states (precise references are in the paper). The case of (b) but not (a) was studied by Lehrer in the early 1990's. The present paper builds on these results (and on the original idea of joint plans which Aumann and Maschler put forth in the 1960's) and proves existence in the more general class of games where complications (a) and (b) are both present.