Partial truth is not uncertainty. Fuzzy logic versus possibilistic logic (Q2771599)

This paper is part of a series of position statements related to a paper of \textit{C. Elkan} [IEEE Expert 9, No. 4, 3-8 (1994; Zbl 1009.03517)] which was intended to give a critical evaluation of the (un-) importance of fuzzy logic (in the wider sense) for AI and knowledge engineering. NEWLINENEWLINENEWLINEMost of these statements explain their authors' points of view or sketch some particular approaches toward fuzzy logic and their applications, particularly in fuzzy control and the modeling of uncertainty. The mathematical and methodological defects of Elkan's paper are most clearly explained in the statements given by \textit{D. Dubois} and \textit{H. Prade} in the present paper and by \textit{G. J. Klir} and \textit{B. Yuan} [ibid. 9, 25-26 (1994; Zbl 1009.03524)].NEWLINENEWLINENEWLINEThe series of papers is closed with a reply by Elkan [ibid. 9, 47-49 (1994; Zbl 1009.03533)].