Screening in a matching market (Q2775927)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1714214
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Screening in a matching market |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1714214 |
Statements
28 February 2002
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contract
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incomplete information
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screening
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Screening in a matching market (English)
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Contract design is studied in a matching market environment. Markets are considered where players meet pair-wise and in each match either side is chosen with some probability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. It is shown that, as frictions become sufficiently low, the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information. In particular, all contracts are free of distortion.
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