Inconsistent-tolerant base revision through argument theory change (Q2903754)

Recently, there has been a renewed interest on the interplay between belief revision and general forms of reasoning. Argumentation represents a reasoning mechanism that is particularly apt for obtaining the consequences of a repository of potentially inconsistent and/or incomplete beliefs.NEWLINENEWLINEThe area where the two research efforts have become confluent has produced a number of interesting results that show a promising opportunity to further our comprehension of the mechanisms involved in general patterns of reasoning. Clearly, the problems involved in this endeavour call for the participation of both communities.NEWLINENEWLINEIn this paper, the authors provide a model of belief change to handle dynamics of knowledge in inconsistent propositional knowledge bases without (necessarily) restoring consistency. An axiomatic is presented and a constructive method based on kernel contraction (with the corresponding representation theorem).