Platonic contrariety (\textit{enantia}): ancestor of the Aristotelian notion of contradiction (\textit{antiphasis})? (Q346754)

In this archaeology of the notion of contradiction, the author shows -- by examining various passages in Plato's dialogues (such as \textit{Charmides} (159a--160d), \textit{Gorgias} (454a--460e), \textit{Ion} (530d--532b), \textit{Laches} (192b--193d), (194d--199e), \textit{Hippias Major} (287e--289d), \textit{Protagoras} (338e--339d), \textit{Hippias Minor} (370e--371c)) and works by Aristotle on contradiction (\textit{antiphasis}) (in particular \textit{On sophistical refutations}) -- that the \textit{elenchos} (refutation) that shows up in Plato's dialogues, and for which we find an explicit definition in the \textit{Sophist} (230b--d), where Plato describes the refutative activity of the ``Noble Sophist'', and the Platonic expression \textit{enantia legein autos hautôi} (to contradict oneself), for which a definition is provided in \textit{Apology of Socrates} (26e6--28a5), are actual precursors of \textit{antiphasis} and that Aristotle was directly influenced by Plato's definition of \textit{elenchos} in his definition of refutation in terms of \textit{antiphasis} in \textit{On sophistical refutations} (V, 167a23--27).