Parallelisable variants of Camellia and SMS4 block cipher: p-Camellia and p-SMS4 (Q381127)
From MaRDI portal
| This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use this page instead for the normal view: Parallelisable variants of Camellia and SMS4 block cipher: p-Camellia and p-SMS4 |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6227469
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Parallelisable variants of Camellia and SMS4 block cipher: p-Camellia and p-SMS4 |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6227469 |
Statements
Parallelisable variants of Camellia and SMS4 block cipher: p-Camellia and p-SMS4 (English)
0 references
15 November 2013
0 references
Summary: We propose two parallelisable variants of Camellia and SMS4 block ciphers based on the \(n\)-cell GF-NLFSR. The \(n\)-cell generalised Feistel-non-linear feedback shift register (GF-NLFSR) structure [\textit{J. Choy} et al., ACISP 2009, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 5594, 73--89 (2009; Zbl 1307.94048); Cryptogr. Commun. 3, No. 3, 141--164 (2011; Zbl 1235.94046)] is a generalised unbalanced Feistel network that can be considered as a generalisation of the outer function \(FO\) of the KASUMI block cipher. An advantage of this cipher over other \(n\)-cell generalised Feistel networks, e.g., SMS4 [\textit{W. Diffe} and \textit{G. Ledin}, ``SMS4 encryption algorithm for wireless networks'', Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/329] and Camellia [\textit{K. Aoki} et al., SAC 2000, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2012, 39--56 (2001; Zbl 1037.94540)], is that it is parallelisable for up to \(n\) rounds. In hardware implementations, the benefits translate to speeding up encryption by up to n times while consuming similar area and significantly less power. At the same time, \(n\)-cell GF-NLFSR structures offer similar proofs of security against differential cryptanalysis as conventional \(n\)-cell Feistel structures. In this paper, we prove security against differential, linear and boomerang attacks. We also show that the selected number of rounds are conservative enough to provide high security margin against other known attacks such as integral, impossible differential, higher order differential, interpolation, slide, XSL and related-key differential attacks.
0 references
generalised unbalanced Feistel network
0 references
GF-NLFSR
0 references
generalised Feistel NLFSR
0 references
nonlinear feedback shift register
0 references
Camellia
0 references
SMS4
0 references
block ciphers
0 references
encryption
0 references
security
0 references
differential cryptanalysis
0 references
cryptography
0 references
attacks
0 references