Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290)

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7309876

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Two-Sided Matching Models	scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7309876

Statements

instance of

scholarly article

0 references

title

Two-Sided Matching Models (English)

0 references

0 references

0 references

Complex Social and Behavioral Systems

0 references

publication date

15 February 2021

0 references

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matching models

0 references

cooperative and noncooperative approaches

0 references

MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

0 references

full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_572

0 references

cites work

Q4130997

0 references

A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings

0 references

On a characterization of stable matchings

0 references

Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems

0 references

Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

0 references

Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations

0 references

A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement

0 references

Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities

0 references

The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners

0 references

On the existence of stable roommate matchings

0 references

Comparative statics in matching markets

0 references

Q3066116

0 references

The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets

0 references

A further note on the stable matching problem

0 references

Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm

0 references

Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues

0 references

Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods

0 references

A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues

0 references

On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings

0 references

Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

0 references

Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

0 references

College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

0 references

Some remarks on the stable matching problem

0 references

Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem

0 references

Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

0 references

The English auction with differentiated commodities

0 references

The Structure of the Stable Roommate Problem: Efficient Representation and Enumeration of All Stable Assignments

0 references

An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem

0 references

Non-cooperative matching games

0 references

The central assignment game and the assignment markets

0 references

Nash implementation of matching rules

0 references

Implementation of college admission rules

0 references

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

0 references

On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

0 references

Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

0 references

Intuitive Probability on Finite Sets

0 references

Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.

0 references

On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model<sup>∗</sup>

0 references

An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.

0 references

Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets

0 references

Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games

0 references

A simple selling and buying procedure

0 references

Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market

0 references

The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

0 references

Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem

0 references

Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

0 references

Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions

0 references

The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

0 references

Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets

0 references

The College Admissions Problem Revisited

0 references

Q3999327

0 references

The assignment game. I: The core

0 references

Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores

0 references

A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages

0 references

The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game

0 references

Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem

0 references

Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market

0 references

A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers

0 references

Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism

0 references

Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.

0 references

Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.

0 references

Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game

0 references

Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market

0 references

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

0 references

The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

0 references

A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching

0 references

Q3895186

0 references

A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications

0 references

Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

1458.91147

0 references

DOI

10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_572

0 references

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

0 references

0 references

0 references

Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:5150290