Forming an agreement between buyers of frequencies for open access at a spectrum auction (Q6545509)

The mathematical apparatus of game theory is traditionally used to explain the behavior of participants and predict the results of auctions. In this paper the problem of an unadvertised agreement between buyers of non-exclusive rights at a spectrum auction for the agreed formation of price bids is considered from the viewpoint of game theory and operations research. The authors suggest two ways of organizing an agreement for an auction with pricing according to the Vickrey rule are proposed for the full awareness of the participants about the amount of income of the partners from using the range of frequencies purchased by pooling. More precisely, it is shown that the lack of information results in an equal distribution of payment between negotiating buyers, and this greatly reduces their competitive advantage in a spectrum auction. Section 5 is devoted to the questions of the applicability of the Clarke-Groves mechanism for solving the problem posed in a situation of uncertainty. \NIn Section 6, the authors consider another approach from the theory of operations research, based on the Germeyer-Vatel model, as the direction of future interests in the development of possible agreements in games with freeriders.