Double moral hayard, monitoring and the nature of contracts (Q698213)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1802476
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Double moral hayard, monitoring and the nature of contracts |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1802476 |
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Double moral hayard, monitoring and the nature of contracts (English)
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5 August 2003
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This paper attempts to provide insights into the choice of two-party contracts commonly observed in industry and agriculture. The model developed considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. A number of theorems is developed but no experiment is performed. It is an interesting theoretical study.
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contracts
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incentives
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transaction costs
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risk premium
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0.79579365
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0.7638017
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0.75389355
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0.74520445
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0.7442675
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0.7428266
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