A logic of good, should, and would. II (Q914659)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the logical behaviour of the sentential operator ``it is good that...'', and its relation to operators of counterfactual implication on the one hand, and obligation and permission on the other hand. Part I [ibid. 19, No.2, 169-199 (1990; Zbl 0698.03016)] discussed informally the author's motivating ideas. Part II, here reviewed, supplies the formal constructions. The general procedure followed is to define a complex kind of possible worlds model, with a triadic relation of accessibility (relative to a point of observation w) and a triadic relation of betterness (also relative to a point of observation w), equipped with truth conditions for a basket of propositional connectives including counterfactual implication, ``it is good that...'' and ``it is obligatory that...''. The first is quite standard; the second and third are novel. The truth conditions for the third appear to be subject to a shortcoming mentioned in the review of Part I.