Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
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Publication:1001814
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.004zbMath1154.91378OpenAlexW2103553799MaRDI QIDQ1001814
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.004
Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (27)
Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study ⋮ Optimal search auctions ⋮ The value of recommendations ⋮ Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning ⋮ Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms ⋮ The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly ⋮ Information acquisition in committees ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition ⋮ Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent ⋮ Abstention, ideology and information acquisition ⋮ Voting with public information ⋮ Committee design with endogenous participation ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case ⋮ Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee ⋮ Optimal delay in committees ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition ⋮ Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering ⋮ Super tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections
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- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
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