Mechanism design with collusive supervision

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.02.006zbMath1154.91529OpenAlexW2105670076MaRDI QIDQ1001815

Gorkem Celik

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

delegationmechanism designcollusionsupervision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Decentralization of contracts with interim side-contracting ⋮ Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Efficient collusion in optimal auctions ⋮ Optimal collusion-proof auctions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Decentralization and collusion
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
• On some agency costs of intermediated contracting

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