Folk theorem with communication

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.005zbMath1154.91336OpenAlexW2167389458MaRDI QIDQ1001817

Ichiro Obara

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.005

zbMATH Keywords

communicationrepeated gamesfolk theoremprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (20)

The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Self-evident events and the value of linking ⋮ Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence ⋮ Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication ⋮ Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network ⋮ Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games ⋮ Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring ⋮ A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games ⋮ Communication and cooperation in repeated games ⋮ An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization ⋮ Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly

Cites Work

• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players

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