Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.05.008zbMath1154.91522OpenAlexW2106040607MaRDI QIDQ1001821

Armando Gomes, Philip Bond

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

fragilityPólya frequency sequencefirst-order approachlog-concavitymultitasking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (8)

Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty ⋮ Generic Property of the Partial Calmness Condition for Bilevel Programming Problems ⋮ Dynamic Contracting: Accidents Lead to Nonlinear Contracts ⋮ Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts ⋮ Endogenous criteria for success ⋮ All-or-nothing payments ⋮ Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations ⋮ Optimal task assignments

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
• On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity

This page was built for publication: Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation