Bayesian coalitional rationalizability

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.004zbMath1154.91322OpenAlexW2167243119MaRDI QIDQ1001823

Xiao Luo, Chih-Chun Yang

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian c-rationalizabilityiterated c-dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Coalitional stochastic stability ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian
• Foundations of Bayesian theory
• Theories of coalitional rationality
• Mutually acceptable courses of action
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Revisiting savage in a conditional world
• Rationalizability for social environments
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Coalitional Rationalizability*
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
• General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments

This page was built for publication: Bayesian coalitional rationalizability