An axiomatic theory of political representation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.005zbMath1154.91376OpenAlexW2027851909MaRDI QIDQ1001832

Christopher P. Chambers

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170809-092845210

zbMATH Keywords

social choicequasi-arithmetic meansproportional representationGerrymanderingrepresentative systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators ⋮ Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Axiomatic districting

Cites Work

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• On nonstrict means
• Consistent representative democracy
• Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
• Formal Structure of Majority Decision
• The Theory of Representative Majority Decision
• Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives

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