The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
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Publication:1001833
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.001zbMath1154.91415OpenAlexW2064638284MaRDI QIDQ1001833
Publication date: 19 February 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2005-35.pdf
Related Items (4)
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Corrigendum to ``Reserve price signaling ⋮ Shills and snipes ⋮ The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
Cites Work
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- Reserve price signaling
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- Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret
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- Bidder collusion
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- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
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- Optimal Auction Design
- Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
- Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
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