Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
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Publication:1002321
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003zbMath1165.91315OpenAlexW2062653411MaRDI QIDQ1002321
Publication date: 25 February 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003
Related Items (24)
New results on egalitarian values for games with a priori unions ⋮ Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ UNIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: SOME INSIGHTS FROM A SIMPLE THREE-PLAYER EXAMPLE ⋮ OUTSIDE OPTIONS IN PROBABILISTIC COALITION SITUATIONS ⋮ On the stability of couples ⋮ The effects of excluding coalitions ⋮ Stability and values for games with coalition structures ⋮ Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions ⋮ Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory ⋮ Solidarity in games with a coalition structure ⋮ The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Null players, outside options, and stability: the conditional Shapley value ⋮ The in-group egalitarian Owen values ⋮ Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets ⋮ Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options ⋮ Nash-stable coalition partition and potential functions in games with coalition structure ⋮ Values and coalition configurations ⋮ Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom ⋮ THE AUMANN-DRÈZE VALUE, THE WIESE VALUE, AND STABILITY: A NOTE ⋮ Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation ⋮ Networks and outside options ⋮ The proportional partitional Shapley value ⋮ The \(\chi\) value and team games
Cites Work
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- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Values of games in partition function form
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
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- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
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- The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
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- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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