Walrasian analysis via two-player games
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Publication:1002333
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.001zbMath1156.91423OpenAlexW2052057009MaRDI QIDQ1002333
Emma Moreno-García, Carlos Hervés-Beloso
Publication date: 25 February 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.001
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) 2-person games (91A05) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (5)
Core equivalences for equilibria supported by non-linear prices ⋮ Market games and Walrasian equilibria ⋮ Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ Linear cost share equilibria and the veto power of the grand coalition ⋮ Large economies and two-player games
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