Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.002zbMath1157.91346OpenAlexW2027143674MaRDI QIDQ1002336

Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano

Publication date: 25 February 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

committeesvotingbargaining powerShapley-Shubik index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization ⋮ Influence functions, followers and command games ⋮ One-dimensional bargaining ⋮ COMPARING POWER INDICES

Cites Work

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• On weighted Shapley values
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• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
• The Bargaining Problem
• Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
• An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
• Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

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