First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.024zbMath1158.91365OpenAlexW2120028079MaRDI QIDQ1002337

Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Publication date: 25 February 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/690

zbMATH Keywords

independent private valuesfirst-price auctionsymmetric equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs

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