Biased procurement auctions
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Publication:1003106
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0346-8zbMath1155.91371OpenAlexW2065151424MaRDI QIDQ1003106
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0346-8
Related Items (10)
Efficiency versus optimality in procurement ⋮ Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers ⋮ On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions ⋮ Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach ⋮ A model of a two-stage all-pay auction ⋮ Introduction to the symposium ⋮ A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding ⋮ Buyer's optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions
Cites Work
- Price discrimination through transactions bundling: The case of monopsony
- Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
- Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Optimal Auction Design
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
- Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
- Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
- Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach.
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