Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
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Publication:1003108
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0348-6zbMath1155.91373OpenAlexW2129063614MaRDI QIDQ1003108
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0348-6
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (6)
A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Two ways to auction off an uncertain good ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment ⋮ Introduction to the symposium
Cites Work
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects
- Sequentially optimal auctions
- Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
- Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply
- Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Intertemporal Price Discrimination
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
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