The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
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Publication:1005239
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2008.01.002zbMath1175.05111OpenAlexW2028966815MaRDI QIDQ1005239
David F. Manlove, Robert W. Irving, Sandy Scott
Publication date: 9 March 2009
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2008.01.002
NP-hardstrongly stablestable matchingweakly stablemaster list including tiesmaster preference liststrictly ordered master listsuper-stable
Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Graph algorithms (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C85)
Related Items (20)
Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents ⋮ Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraints ⋮ Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories ⋮ The Price of Matching with Metric Preferences ⋮ Stable matchings of teachers to schools ⋮ A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem ⋮ Hedonic diversity games: a complexity picture with more than two colors ⋮ Stable marriage with groups of similar agents ⋮ Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list ⋮ A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ Popular matchings with variable item copies ⋮ Solving hard stable matching problems involving groups of similar agents ⋮ Maximum locally stable matchings ⋮ Geometric stable roommates ⋮ Maximum stable matching with one-sided ties of bounded length ⋮ Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core ⋮ The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas
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