Committees, sequential voting and transparency

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.05.008zbMath1155.91341OpenAlexW3122966117MaRDI QIDQ1005748

Volker Hahn

Publication date: 10 March 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

committeesvotinginformation aggregationtransparencysequential voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

On the drawbacks of large committees ⋮ Information acquisition and transparency in committees ⋮ Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?

Cites Work

• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Is Transparency To No Avail?*
• Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations
• Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting

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