On the support size of stable strategies in random games

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.056zbMath1157.91311OpenAlexW2070524150MaRDI QIDQ1006075

Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis

Publication date: 17 March 2009

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.056

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamesbimatrix gamesevolutionary stable strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game ⋮ Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games ⋮ On random quadratic forms: supports of potential local maxima ⋮ On sparsity of the solution to a random quadratic optimization problem ⋮ Building a completely positive factorization ⋮ The Complexity of Simple Models—A Study of Worst and Typical Hard Cases for the Standard Quadratic Optimization Problem ⋮ On Random Symmetric Bimatrix Games

Cites Work

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• How large is the support of an ESS?
• Game theory and evolution
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game

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