Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon's dilemma

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0304-XzbMath1156.91357OpenAlexW2064439708MaRDI QIDQ1006578

Cheng-Zhong Qin, Chun-Lei Yang

Publication date: 25 March 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0304-x

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designVickrey auctionDekel-Fudenberg procedureinformation robustnessiterative conditional dominanceKing Solomon's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players

Cites Work

• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
• A general solution to King Solomon's dilemma
• A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
• Distributing awards efficiently: more on King Solomon's problem
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Robust Mechanism Design

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