Optimal collusion-proof auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004zbMath1157.91342OpenAlexW2128089223MaRDI QIDQ1007321

Jinwoo Kim, Yeon-Koo Che

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

an exclusion principlecollusion on participationmultiple bidding cartelssubgroup collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Self-rejecting mechanisms ⋮ Consulting collusive experts ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information ⋮ Bidding collusion without passive updating ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions

Cites Work

• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Bidder collusion
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Collusion and Price Rigidity

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