The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.010zbMath1158.91316OpenAlexW1541475132MaRDI QIDQ1007327

Ben McQuillin

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuerecursionexternalitiescoalition structurepartition function games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (17)

Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach ⋮ The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities ⋮ Balanced externalities and the Shapley value ⋮ On convexity in cooperative games with externalities ⋮ Fair division in the presence of externalities ⋮ On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies ⋮ Marginality and convexity in partition function form games ⋮ Nash bargaining solution under externalities ⋮ Evaluating groups with the generalized Shapley value ⋮ Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities ⋮ Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms ⋮ An Extension of the Solidarity Value for Environments with Externalities ⋮ Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues ⋮ Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

Cites Work

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• Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Values of games in partition function form
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
• Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• N‐person games in partition function form

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