A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.005zbMath1158.91320OpenAlexW2088743496MaRDI QIDQ1007331

Yuichi Yamamoto

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationrepeated gamebelief-free equilibriumprivate monitoringalmost-perfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play ⋮ A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring ⋮ Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Learning a population distribution ⋮ Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal

Cites Work

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• Folk theorem with communication
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• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
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• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication
• Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
• Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

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