Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
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Publication:1007334
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.011zbMath1157.91343OpenAlexW2158682044MaRDI QIDQ1007334
Publication date: 20 March 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.011
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