The role of optimal threats in auction design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.11.006zbMath1158.91360OpenAlexW2037016669MaRDI QIDQ1007337

Nicolás Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.006

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesoptimal auctionstype-dependent outside options

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO ⋮ Partial ownership and cross-border mergers ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities ⋮ Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information ⋮ Inefficiency in the shadow of unobservable reservation payoffs

Cites Work

• Haggling over substitutes
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
• Optimal Auction Design

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