Aggregation of expert opinions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.010zbMath1158.91335OpenAlexW3123525123MaRDI QIDQ1007768

Andrew Postlewaite, Dino Gerardi, Richard P. McLean

Publication date: 24 March 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/working-papers/05-016.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms ⋮ Picking the winners ⋮ Consistency and communication in committees ⋮ Evaluation and strategic manipulation ⋮ Quantification of Operational Risk: A Scenario-Based Approach ⋮ Communication in financial markets with several informed traders ⋮ Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition ⋮ Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees

Cites Work

• Implementation in differential information economies
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Professional advice
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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