Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
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Publication:1007771
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.010zbMath1158.91364OpenAlexW3121931913MaRDI QIDQ1007771
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.010
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items
Bidding in a possibly common-value auction ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ The insider's curse ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions ⋮ Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance ⋮ Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions ⋮ Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
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