Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1007773
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.02.009zbMath1156.91328OpenAlexW2790107907MaRDI QIDQ1007773
Bezalel Peleg, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp404.pdf
Related Items (4)
The structure of unstable power mechanisms ⋮ Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions ⋮ A stability index for local effectivity functions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Binary effectivity rules
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
This page was built for publication: Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
