Learning by trial and error
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Publication:1007782
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.011zbMath1158.91327OpenAlexW2163505601MaRDI QIDQ1007782
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.011
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