Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games

DOI10.1007/s10100-006-0019-2zbMath1160.91309OpenAlexW1986863756MaRDI QIDQ1011846

Axel Ostmann, Holger Ingmar Meinhardt

Publication date: 14 April 2009

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10535/5375

zbMATH Keywords

KernelFairnessCommons DilemmaTU Games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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