Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4zbMath1159.91353OpenAlexW2169352240MaRDI QIDQ1014329

M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 27 April 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0358-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (13)

On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies ⋮ Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules ⋮ Nash implementable domains for the Borda count ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule ⋮ Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains ⋮ Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information ⋮ Strategy-Proof Location Functions on Finite Graphs

Cites Work

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• A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity
• Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions

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