A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2008.07.049zbMath1159.91381OpenAlexW2103682837MaRDI QIDQ1015002

Henry Schellhorn

Publication date: 30 April 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.07.049

zbMATH Keywords

economic equilibriumcombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A trading mechanism contingent on several indices

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• Combination trading with limit orders
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• An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• The Feasibility of an Index-Contingent Trading Mechanism
• Equilibrium Analysis of Exchange Economies with Indivisible Commodities

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