Mutually acceptable courses of action
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Publication:1016329
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0349-5zbMath1166.91003OpenAlexW2119112198MaRDI QIDQ1016329
Joseph Greenberg, Xiao Luo, Sudheer Gupta
Publication date: 5 May 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0349-5
Related Items (11)
Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ Rational play in extensive-form games ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences ⋮ Bayesian coalitional rationalizability ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ On the foundation of stability ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
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