Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity
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Publication:1017782
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.009zbMath1159.91349OpenAlexW1974752456MaRDI QIDQ1017782
Publication date: 12 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.009
probabilistic beliefsambiguityqualitative probabilitymultiple priorsunambiguous eventsprobabilistic sophisticationcomparative likelihood
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