Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.005zbMath1159.91336OpenAlexW2132980272MaRDI QIDQ1017787

Masaki Aoyagi, Guillaume R. Fréchette

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/3140

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescooperationcollusionimperfect public monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (19)

Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction ⋮ Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks ⋮ Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments ⋮ Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism ⋮ IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ Direct reciprocity in structured populations ⋮ Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: an experiment ⋮ Adding noise to the institution: an experimental welfare investigation of the contribution-based grouping mechanism ⋮ Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods ⋮ Similar bidders in takeover contests ⋮ Noisy signaling: theory and experiment ⋮ A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games ⋮ At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency ⋮ Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference ⋮ ``I'm just a soul whose intentions are good: the role of communication in noisy repeated games ⋮ Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence ⋮ Frequency of interaction, communication and collusion: an experiment ⋮ An experimental analysis of asymmetric power in conflict bargaining

Uses Software

• Stata
• nbreg

Cites Work

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