A theory of political cycles

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.10.006zbMath1159.91324OpenAlexW3121328059MaRDI QIDQ1017789

Leonardo Conegundes Martinez

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

electionsdynamic gamesagencyreputationcareer concernspolitical cycles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (2)

Markovian strategies with continuous and impulse controls for a differential game model of revolution ⋮ Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover

Cites Work

• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• Strategic Promotion and Compensation

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