Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.005zbMath1159.91329OpenAlexW2004115884MaRDI QIDQ1017791

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.info/PDFS/E200610.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumimplementation theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Selecting winners with partially honest jurors ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms ⋮ Picking the winners ⋮ Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction ⋮ Evaluation and strategic manipulation ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants ⋮ Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• The scholarship assignment problem
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Divide-and-permute
• A Model of Expertise
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality