Manipulation through political endorsements

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.002zbMath1159.91357OpenAlexW2170623135MaRDI QIDQ1017792

Mehmet Ekmekci

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59647

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingsignallingCondorcet losermultiple candidates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Pre-election polling and third party candidates ⋮ A model of pre-electoral coalition formation ⋮ Manipulation through political endorsements

Cites Work

• Decisiveness of contributors' perceptions in elections
• Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
• Manipulation through political endorsements
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1

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