Reputation and exogenous private learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.01.005zbMath1159.91323OpenAlexW2079754130MaRDI QIDQ1017801

Thomas Wiseman

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

learningreputationnoisy signalschain store game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation ⋮ Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning ⋮ Impermanent types and permanent reputations ⋮ Sustainable reputations with rating systems

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Common Learning
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions

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